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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 31/07/2006 Accident number: 427 
Accident time: 07:50 Accident Date: 26/06/2003 
Where it occurred: Talaimannar Pier, 
Mannar district 
Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 12/08/2003 
ID original source: MAN/03/001 Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Type 72 AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
metal fragments 
sandy 
Date record created: 29/07/2006 Date  last modified: 31/07/2006 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 4 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: E79  43' 52" Map north: N09  06' 24" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate equipment (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
A preliminary investigation report was made available in 2005. The UNDP Inquiry report was 
made available in 2006, and is held on record. It duplicates the following, which has been 
edited for anonymity.  
Preliminary Investigation Report 
1 
1. 
a)  This accident report has been written in accordance with the terms of reference 
supplied by the [Demining group] SOP in the absence of Program manager who is on leave .  
A copy of the terms of reference is attached at Annex A. 
2.   
a)  The accident occurred at approximately 7.50 am on Thursday 26th June 2003 . 
[Demining group] demining site at Thalaimannar Pier, in the Mannar District of Northern 
Province of Sri Lanka (Long /Lat N09° 06’ 24”, E79° 43’ 52”).  The casualty was taken place 
whilst demining .   No witnesses to the accident. [In an IMSMA style form, the level of 
vegetation was selected as “light” and “grass”.] 
According to the deminer statement He has cleared the line about  1 m to 1,5 meter and  
made search for signal  in one location he got more signals and have made a deep hole to try 
to located the signals when he was satisfy with the investigation of the hole he has moved his 
base stick and got up from his knee position to take the gardening shear in order to cut side 
vegetation at that time his left leg twisted skid towards in the previous excavation hole . 
Immediately he heard some noise and sand and dust all over his body  the smoke also 
coming from the direction and he fell down. Prior to the explosion, the casualty had been 
getting multiple signals from the large amount of disintegrating barbed wire in the area.  He 
was confused by the large number of signals and failed to investigate all of them, believing 
then to be barbed wire fragments. 
 
[A picture of the accident site is shown above.] 
The deminer failed to inform his section leader, team leader or supervisor that he was having 
difficulties. He was using a new Ebinger 421GC detector, serial number 537.  This detector  
was successfully  tested  on 30 June 2003 in [Demining group] Vavuniya office in presence of 
DMAO Technical Advisor ,[Demining group] Operation officer and MAT Supervisor. The test 
was realize by using a test piece containing a Live detonator of Pakistani AP P4 mine  buried 
at 13 cm from the top side of the test piece. After this test another detector use by the team 
was successfully tested in the same condition. 
The accident crater was approximately 15 cm behind to the base stick, and ground checked 
by the deminer. It has a depth of 19cm and a diameter of 54 cm. 
 
[A picture of the crater is shown above.] 
This indicates that the mine was buried more than 13 cm below the surface. The centre of the 
crater was  75cm from an existing barbed wire fence.  Excavation of the crater revealed 
fragments of a  China Type 72 antipersonnel blast mine (see device technical report on 
Annex g). 
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The mine was activated by the inside of the deminer’s left heel.  The sole of the boot 
sustained no damage. I surmise that the deminer may have stood on the side of his 
investigation hole and pushed the very loose sand onto a mine. This sand initiated the mine 
and also provided a buffer from the effect of the blast lessening the potential injury . 
b) The casualty sustained calcaneus  heel minor crack on his left leg.  There were 2 
deep lacerations, one on either side of the heel. There was also a very minor scratch on the 
right forearm that required no medical treatment.  The injuries to the foot were caused by the 
passage of the explosive shock wave.  The surgeon who conducted an exploratory procedure 
found no large foreign objects in the lacerations. 
[It took four minutes for the victim to receive medical care, and 25 minutes to reach the local 
hospital where he was stabilised for 30 minutes before being moved to a final surgical facility 
120 km away (2 hours).] 
c) There was no damage caused to any [Demining group] equipments or private 
property.  Only the deminer’s left boot  were slightly damaged in the blast. (see photograph 
below). 
 
d)     The deminer had successfully completed the [Demining group] basic deminer course 
which was held in Vavuniya during the period of 10 March to 05 April 2003.  Due to the lack of 
demining equipment he was place on standby until June 16 2003. Since that date he has 
been working in Talaimannar minefield,  [Demining group] supervisory staff had closely 
monitored him; he spent his first week in a low-risk area and only moved into the minefield 
when it was felt that he had enough confidence . During his second week of work he found 6 
mines. 
e)        Deminers had started work at the site at 6.30am.  The accident  happened at 7.50 am. 
There had been no rest periods in that time. The morning is a relatively cool part of the day.  
The next scheduled break for the deminer was a 30-minute break at 8.00am – for breakfast. 
f)  The deminer had started work two weeks prior to the accident. He had not had 
leave. 
g) No internal QA evaluations had been conducted. 
h)  No refresher training have been carried out for the team. 
The casualty was wearing  his personal protective equipment, his helmet and visor, his 
kneepads and his boots according to the  Sri Lanka [Demining group] SOP . 
 J)       The Helmet, visor, a protective jacket has been inspected and no  
fragmentation pieces mark or any part of mine body or soil or part The only parts of the 
equipment related to this accident is only boots.  If  the deminer has not  wearing boots, most 
probably severe injuries would probably caused to the deminer. 
k)  1 ambulance and 2 trained medic with fully equipped trauma kit were available 
on site The medic and ambulance reached the deminer within approximately 3 minutes of the 
detonation.  He was immediately given first aid and evacuated to Mannar Base Hospital, in 
accordance with the casualty evacuation drill.  The medic acted professionally, quickly and in 
accordance with his training. 
l) The area where the deminer was working in  a heavily metal contaminated area,  
(adjacent to rusting barbed wire exposed to salt sea air for the last ten years)  the signals 
from the mine detector may have confused the deminer.     
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It is impossible to clear these areas from “metal free” . Working in these areas,  the deminers 
have been told by the section leader to excavate all readings down to 13 centimetres,  and 
quite often means excavating the entire area it is more likely that the mine was buried at a 
depth of greater than 13cm.   
The weather was good at the accident time no strong wind or heavy temperature was 
reported .There is no evidence, or reason to suspect, that drugs, medication or alcohol 
contributed towards the accident. 
m)  In the sandy areas extremely contaminated by particles of metal like old rusty 
barbed wire fence . Excavation drill to a depth of 15cm minimum should replace detectors in 
this area. 
n)  The deminer had no known health concerns prior to the accident. During the 
training period of the basic deminer course he has passed a complete medical check given by 
surgeon working in Vavuniya government hospital. Nothing special was reported  
o)  Drinking water is available at the site.  All deminers have water bottles and are 
encouraged to drink as much as they need.  Deminers are given a daily food allowance and 
can buy food from a shop close to the minefield.  Covered rest areas are established 
throughout the minefield. 
p)  There is no systematic rotation of deminers between lanes. The composition of 
the team varies from week to week to give deminers experience of different tasks between 
Vavuniya and Mannar district . 
 
3.  
a)      Close to the accident site an old bakery was establish some year ago all the ashes 
resulting the use of the oven of the bakery was sprayed all around for many year mixing with 
the original sand. The crater caused by the detonation was 19 cm deep, suggesting that the 
mine was buried at a depth greater than the 13cm recommended by [Demining group] SOP 
Sri Lanka .Since the team began working on this task on 19th February 2003 they had 
removed 986 Chinese Type 72A, 107 Pakistani P4s and 9 Claymore type mines by 20th 
June.  Except for the mine involved in the accident, all other mines were surface laid or were 
laid within 5 cm under the surface.   
(The area is located between 2 barbwire fences. The soil is heavily contaminated by metal 
from rusty fence and domestic scrap. The soil is constituted by sand and ash from an old 
bakery located close to the fence.) 
The Deminer was relative inexperience due to his stand by after the training. It concern that 
the deminer became confused by the large number of signals he was receiving from his 
detector, and may not properly investigate  all the reading . 
Although it is most likely that the accident was caused by a deeply buried mine, it is not 
known if the deminer’s non-compliance with SOPs contributed towards the accident.  
 
4. 
a)      Detectors will not be used in the heavily metal contaminated area like between old rusty 
barbed wire fence.  These areas should be cleared using excavation methods down to a 
minimum depth of 15cms. 
And clearly identify from other area free of metal by using wooden red post deeply buried 
around all the perimeter of the no free of metal area. 
b)  No modification of equipment are required the deminer tool kit contain already a 
small  hand gardening rake for excavation in sandy areas. 
c )      The complete team should receive a refreshing training  on: 
Action  “on signal reading investigation “ including immediate reporting to supervision staff in 
case of any problem or difficulties occur, full excavation drill and using detector in areas 
heavily contaminated by metal. 
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d)      Detectors will not be used in the heavily metal contaminated area like between old rusty 
barbed wire fence.  These areas should be cleared using excavation methods down to a 
minimum depth of 15cms.   
e)    The  internal QC control should take place on a daily basis in high metal contaminated 
areas. 
f)  In order to maximise the working time in the cooler morning hours, working time 
should be rescheduled. The system of rest breaks should be re implemented in accordance 
with [Demining group] Sri Lanka SOPs. 
Signed: [Demining group] Operation Officer 
 
Annexes: [All held on file, but none with embedded photographs/] 
A copy of the terms of reference for this report 
A copy of the preliminary investigation report 
Statements of witnesses and concerned [Demining group] personnel 
Photographs of accident site and equipments  
A sketch map of the accident site 
A medical report from Vavuniya general hospital  
A device technical report 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 570 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 25 minutes 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: Not recorded, worn 





See Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A scribbled medical note from Base hospital, Vavuniya includes “Plan: has to be non weight 
bearing for 3 months”. 
The National Authority report listed the injuries as: “fractured left heel bone. Deep lacerations 
both sides of heel. Scratch on right forearm”. 
The casualty sustained calcaneus  heel minor crack on his left leg.  There were 2 deep 
lacerations, one on either side of the heel. There was also a very minor scratch on the right 
forearm that required no medical treatment.  The injuries to the foot were caused by the 
passage of the explosive shock wave.  The surgeon who conducted an exploratory procedure 




The following are held on file. 
A copy of the terms of reference for this report 
A copy of the preliminary investigation report 
Statements of witnesses and concerned [Demining group] personnel 
Photographs of accident site and equipments  
A sketch map of the accident site 
A medical report from Vavuniya general hospital  
A device technical report 
UNDP National Mine Action Authority investigation report 
District Mine Action Office, Vavuniya: 1st July 2003 
This was made available in 2006. It is an edited version of the Internal report and contained 
no new information. It is held on record. 
 
Statements 
STATEMENT – SUPERVISOR 
1.  [Demining group] deminer,  [the victim],  stepped on and initiated a mine whilst 
conducting his demining duties at Taliamannar Pier at approximately 0750 hours on the 
morning of 26 June 2003.     As the [Demining group] Supervisor on site I submit this report. 
Background. 
2. The [Demining group]’s  Vavuniya MAT has been conducting a demining 
operation in an area of Mannar island known as Taliamannar Pier (East). We started 
operations on 19 February 2003, and to date have cleared 5000 square meters  (of the 
estimated 9000) and removed and destroyed some 1000 mines.   (Chinese Type 72,   
Pakistan P4 and various models of the “Claymore”  type mine) 
3.  Recently we have received approval to start clearance on a minefield at 
Taliamannar west,  an area approximately 300 meters from the current operation.  Work was 
started at this site on 17 June 2003. 
4.  We have had eight deminers on site since the start of the operation,  recently 
more equipment  (PPE, Visors,  detectors,  etc) have become available and we have been 
able to employ deminers trained earlier this year.  [The victim]  has been on site for two 
weeks. He has been under constant supervision for those two weeks and accessed as being 
competent. 
 
Work Schedule  
5. Due to the extreme heat in the middle and latter part of the day, (40 degrees +) 
we have adopted an “early start, early finish” working day.  Incorporating a 15 minute break 
every hour, the working day is as follows:      
 a. 0615 - on site; 
 b. 0630 - start work;  (work through until breakfast) 
 c. 0800 - breakfast  (30 minutes); 
 d. 1215 - lunch break (45 minutes);  and 
 e. 1430 - finish work. 
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Events Prior to Mine Accident 
6.  The team arrived on site as usual and began work, the Team Leader,  [Name 
excised]   was at the Taliamannar West site with Section Leader,  [Name excised],   two 
deminers  and medic,   [Name excised].  Myself and Section Leader, [Name excised],  were at 
the Taliamannar East site with nine deminers. I had just arrived back at the Control Point (CP)   
after An initial check around the site. The medic, [Name excised],  and driver [Name excised] 
were at the CP.      
 
Mine Accident 
7. At 0750 a muffled explosion was heard in the minefield  (the accident site is 
approximately 350 meters from the CP)  [The medic] used the Motorola  (site communication 
VHF radio)  to contact the Section Leader  who said that there had been an accident and to 
come to the beach area of the minefield.  The medic, driver and I drove to the accident site in 
the ambulance. 
8. On arriving at the accident site,  the Section Leader  and two deminers had 
evacuated the injured deminer to the roadside and were in the process of removing his PPE. 
[The medic] accessed the injury was to the left foot and removed the boot,  then transported 
him to the CP to stabilise him prior to evacuation to Mannar hospital.  
9.  I remained at the accident site,  rang Mannar Hospital to advise that a injured 
deminer was on his way and instructed the Section Leader and a deminer to remain at the 
accident site,   that nothing was to be moved and to mark off the accident site and control the 
crowd that had gathered.  
10. The Team Leader had arrived at the accident site,  he and I made our way to the 
CP.      [The medic] was in the process of stabilising the patient and preparing him for 
transport to the hospital.  The injured deminer had some bruising and puncture wounds on his 
left foot,  he was conscious and coherent, albeit he had stood on a mine he was in 
remarkable good condition. The ambulance left the site at 0810. 
 
Post Accident 
11.  I rung Bala  ([Demining group] National Operations Officer)  in Vavuniya and 
informed him that there had been a mine accident,  that the patient was on his way to Mannar 
Hospital and asked him to ring the hospital and confirm that they had received my message 
that a mine injury patient was on his way.  
12. I rung [Name excised, Demining group]’s Senior Technical Advisor and informed 
him of the accident,  he asked me to contact the District Mine Action Officer, [name excised], 
and advise him of the situation.    [He] would inform [Demining group] HQ and other 
necessary notaries. 
13.  At approx 1100  the surgeon for Mannar Hospital came to see me on site  (I 
know him personally after conducting Mine Awareness Training at Mannar Hospital last 
month) and he advised that the deminer was in no serious trouble,  he had lacerations to his 
left foot,  some bruising and a minor fracture of his heel bone,  he will up walking in a week,  a 
lucky man!!!!     The injured deminer was transferred to Vavuniya Hospital at 1700hrs  to be 
with his wife and family. 
14.  [Name excised] arrived on site at approximately 1200hrs   He explained the 
investigation procedure to me and we proceeded to the site to conduct his initial investigation. 
[Name excised] left the site to return to Vavuniya at approximately 1330,  he took with him 
[the victim]’s  Ebinger  (No 537) his PPE body armour,  helmet and visor,  and his boots  




15. In a drama filled few minutes,  the medic [name excised],  quietly and confidently 
accessed and managed the incident with the professionalism that he has displayed since 
becoming a member of [Demining group]. 
16. The evacuation procedure of the injured deminer from the minefield (although I 
was not present at the scene) appears to have gone smoothly and is a credit to the Section 
Leader and deminers on site.  ( We have conducted evaluation drills on a regular basis, 
training pays off) 
17. On examining the accident site and talking with the Section Leader,  it appears 
that the deminer was moving in his cleared area behind the basestick,  stood up to get his 
shears in order to cut some grass and stood on the mine. He fell into the cleared area and 
was easily extracted from the site by the Section Leader and two deminers. 
18. The area the deminer was working in is a heavily metal contaminated area,  
(adjacent to rusting barbed wire exposed to salt sea air for the last ten years)  the signals 
from the mine detector may have confused the deminer.  It is impossible to clear these areas 
“metal free”  Working in these areas,  the deminers have been told to excavate all readings 
down to 13 centimetres, and quite often means excavating the entire area. 
19.  From the size of the crater left by the mine detonating,  (19 cm deep x 54 cm 
wide) and the relatively minor injuries received by the deminer,  it may be that the mine may 
have been deeper than the deminers are required to check? 
20.  There was no damage to any equipment on site. he Deminer’s PPE was not 
damaged, his boot showed the only signs that there had been a mine accident at all.  The 
blast had separated the boot upper from the sole over approximately 5 cm along the inside of 
the heel area, the sole and leather boot upper were not damaged. 
 
Conclusion 
21. The deminers are obviously distraught over the mine incident. The injured man 
was lucky to escape with only minor injuries. Factors I feel might have been an influencing 
factor on this accident: 
 a.  the Deminer’s relative inexperience; 
 b.  the high metal content of the ground;  and 




STATEMENTOF SECTION LEADER [Name excised] 
 
I am[Name excised], Section Leader on the site where [the victim] was working on the 26 
June 2003. 
I was initially employed by [Demining group] as a deminer after qualifying on my Deminers 
course early November 2002.  I was promoted to Section Leader in April of this year when the 
new MAT was formed in April. 
On the morning of 26 June 2003    I was on site at Taliamannar East observing my section in 
the minefield. At approximately 0750 I heard an explosion coming from the work area of [the 
Victim]. I was about 25 meters away at this time  observing deminer [Name excised]. 
I immediately went to see what the situation was and found [the Victim] was lying face up in 
an area that he had already cleared,  he was not making any noise but I could see that he 
had some injury to his leg area,  I summoned [Name excised] to give me a hand. I used the 
radio to summon the Medic and ambulance to the accident site. 
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By the time that [Name excised] and I had the deminer out to the roadside,  the medic,  
ambulance and Supervisor were arriving,  the medic took over control of the injured man. 
The supervisor asked me to remain on site,  manage the crowd that had formed and mark off 
the accident site to prevent any interference with the accident site. 
The supervisor and [Name excised] of the DMAO arrived to conduct the initial investigation at 
approx 1200. 
Signed: Section Leader 
 
STATEMENT -  DEMINER [Name excised] 
I am [Name excised],  I was working in the area where [the victim] was working on the 
morning of 26 June 2003. 
I am employed by [Demining group] as a deminer after qualifying on my Deminers course 
early November 2002.      
At approximately 0750 I heard an explosion coming from the work area where I knew [the 
Victim] was working.  My section leader,  [Name excised], was with me at the time. 
The section leader went to investigate what had happened and shortly after called deminer 
[Name excised] (also working in the area) and myself to give him a hand to move [the victim] 
out of the minefield as it appeared he had initiated a mine. 
We moved the injured deminer out to the road and the medic and ambulance arrived within 
the next minute.  The medic assumed control of the injured man. 
The Section Leader and I remained at the accident site for the remainder of the morning to 
secure the site. 
Signed: Deminer 
 
STATEMENT -  DEMINER [the Victim] 
I , [Name excised] employed in [Demining group] as a deminer since 2 week . After qualifying 
on my Deminer course on April 2003 and due to the lack of equipment I was on stand by 
position. 
On  June 16 2003 I have  to start my work in Talaimannar and allocated in the refreshing 
training position in a low risk mine area . After this week I have started to work in a new area  
since Monday 23 June the day that I start  I have found 6 mines in my  new allocated area .  
On 26 June 2003 , after the security briefing given by the team leader.  Approximately 06 40 
AM , I was send to my area to start work. I cleared the line about up to 1 to 1,5 meter and I 
made search for signal one position I got more signals and I made a deep hole to try to 
located the signals when I was satisfy with the investigation of the hole  I moved my base 
stick and got up from my knee position to take the gardening shear in order to cut side 
vegetation at that time my left leg twisted skid towards in the previous excavation hole . 
Immediately I heard some noise and sand and dust all over my body  the smoke also coming 
from the direction and I fell down . I realize that my left leg got sever paining .At this time 
section leader rush to the scene and pull me out of the mine area .  
Signed: the victim  
 
Maps 





The primary cause of this incident is listed as “Unavoidable” because it seems likely that the 
mine was buried at a depth beyond the search capacity of the deminer (and far deeper than 
the National minimum clearance depth of 10cm). The secondary cause is listed as 
“Inadequate equipment” because the deminer was not issued with tools capable of dealing 
with the threat. Powerful magnets could have made the clearance of fragmentation very much 
easier. 
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